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Abstract. We present VERIFAI, a software toolkit for the formal design and
analysis of systems that include artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning
(ML) components. VERIFAI particularly seeks to address challenges with apply-
ing formal methods to perception and ML components, including those based on
neural networks, and to model and analyze system behavior in the presence of
environment uncertainty. We describe the initial version of VERIFAI which cen-
ters on simulation guided by formal models and specifications. Several use cases
are illustrated with examples, including temporal-logic falsification, model-based
systematic fuzz testing, parameter synthesis, counterexample analysis, and data
set augmentation.
Keywords: Formal methods · Falsification · Simulation · Cyber-physical sys-
tems · Machine Learning · Artificial Intelligence · Autonomous Vehicles
1 Introduction
The increasing use of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) in systems,
including safety-critical systems, has brought with it a pressing need for formal meth-
ods and tools for their design and verification. However, AI/ML-based systems, such as
autonomous vehicles, have certain characteristics that make the application of formal
methods very challenging [16]. First, several uses of AI/ML are for perception, the use
of computational systems to mimic human perceptual tasks such as object recognition
and classification, conversing in natural language, etc. For such perception components,
writing a formal specification is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Additionally, the
signals processed by such components can be very high-dimensional, such as streams
of images or LiDAR data. Second, machine learning being a dominant paradigm in
AI, formal tools must be compatible with the data-driven design flow for ML and also
be able to handle the complex, high-dimensional structures in ML components such as
deep neural networks. Third, the environments in which AI/ML-based systems oper-
ate can be very complex, with considerable uncertainty even about how many (which)
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agents are in the environment (both human and robotic), let alone about their intentions
and behaviors. As an example, consider the difficulty in modeling urban traffic envi-
ronments in which an autonomous car must operate. Indeed, AI/ML is often introduced
into these systems precisely to deal with such complexity and uncertainty! From a for-
mal methods perspective, this makes it very hard to create realistic environment models
with respect to which one can perform verification or synthesis.
In this paper, we introduce the VERIFAI toolkit, our initial attempt to address the
three challenges — perception, learning, and environments — that are outlined above.
VERIFAI takes the following approach:
• Perception: A perception component maps a concrete feature space (e.g. pixels) to
an output such as a prediction or state estimate. To deal with the lack of specifica-
tion for perception components, VERIFAI analyzes them in the context of a closed-
loop system using a system-level specification. Moreover, to scale to complex high-
dimensional feature spaces, VERIFAI operates on an abstract feature space (or se-
mantic feature space) [8] that describes semantic aspects of the environment being
perceived, not the raw features such as pixels.
• Learning: VERIFAI aims to not only analyze the behavior of ML components but
also use formal methods for their (re-)design. To this end, it provides features to
(i) design the data set for training and testing [7], (ii) analyze counterexamples to
gain insight into mistakes by the ML model, as well as (iii) synthesize parameters,
including hyper-parameters for training algorithms and ML model parameters.
• Environment Modeling: Since it can be difficult, if not impossible, to exhaustively
model the environments of AI-based systems, VERIFAI aims to provide ways to cap-
ture a designer’s assumptions about the environment, including distribution assump-
tions made by ML components, and to describe the abstract feature space in an intu-
itive, declarative manner. To this end, VERIFAI provides users with SCENIC [10], a
probabilistic programming language for modeling environments. SCENIC, combined
with a renderer or simulator for generating sensor data, can produce semantically-
consistent input for perception components.
VERIFAI is currently focused on AI-based cyber-physical systems (CPS), although
its basic ideas can also be applied to other AI-based systems. As a pragmatic choice,
we focus on simulation-based verification, where the simulator is treated as a black
box, so as to be broadly applicable to the range of simulators used in industry. The
input to VERIFAI is a “closed-loop” CPS model, comprising a composition of the
AI-based system under verification with an environment model, and a property on
the closed-loop model. The AI-based system typically comprises a perception com-
ponent, a planner/controller, and the plant (i.e., the system under control). VERIFAI’s
output depends on the feature being exercised by the user. The current version offers the
following use cases: (1) temporal-logic falsification; (2) model-based fuzz testing; (3)
counterexample-guided data augmentation; (4) counterexample (error table) analysis;
(5) hyper-parameter synthesis, and (6) model parameter synthesis. To our knowledge,
VERIFAI is the first tool to offer this suite of use cases in an integrated fashion, unified
by a common representation of an abstract feature space with an accompanying model-
ing language and search algorithms over this feature space. The problem of temporal-
logic falsification or simulation-based verification of CPS models is well studied and
several tools exist (e.g. [3,9]); these techniques have been extended to CPS models with
ML components by us and others [6,17]. Work on verification of ML components, es-
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pecially neural networks (e.g., [20,11]), is complementary to the system-level analysis
performed by VERIFAI. Fuzz testing based on formal models is common in software
engineering (e.g. [12]) but our work is unique in the CPS context. Property-directed
parameter synthesis for hybrid systems has also been studied well in the formal meth-
ods/CPS community (e.g. [5]), and we can leverage these results in VERIFAI. Finally,
to our knowledge, our work on augmenting training/test data sets [7], implemented in
VERIFAI, is the first use of formal techniques for this purpose. In Sec. 2, we describe
how the tool is structured so as to provide the above features. Sec. 3 illustrates the use
cases via examples from the domain of autonomous driving.
2 VERIFAI Structure and Operation
The current version of the VERIFAI toolkit is focused on simulation-based analysis
and design of AI components for perception or control, potentially those using ma-
chine learning, in the context of a closed-loop cyber-physical system. Fig. 1 depicts the
structure and operation of the toolkit.
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Fig. 1. Structure and Operation of VERIFAI.
Inputs and Outputs: In order to use VERIFAI, a user must first set up a simulator for
the domain of interest. As we explain in Sec. 3, we have experimented with multiple
robotics simulators and provide these in the artifact accompanying the paper. Once
this step is done, the user begins by constructing the inputs to VERIFAI, including
(i) a simulatable model of the system, including code for one or more controllers and
perception components, and a dynamical model of the system being controlled (e.g.,
vehicle); (ii) a probabilistic model of the environment, specifying constraints on the
workspace, the locations of agents and objects, and the dynamical behavior of agents,
and (iii) a property on the composition of the system and its environment (the simulator
defines the form of composition). VERIFAI is implemented in Python as we found
this language to be the easiest to interoperate with machine learning and AI libraries
and simulators across platforms. The code for the controller and perception component
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can be arbitrary executable code, typically in a language such as Python or C. The
environment model typically involves two steps: first, in the simulator, the different
agents have to be set up using the interface provided by the simulator; then, constraints
about the agents and the workspace can be declaratively specified using the SCENIC
probabilistic programming language developed by some of the authors [10]. Finally,
the property to be checked can be expressed in multiple ways depending on the use
case of VERIFAI being exercised, including metric temporal logic [2,18], objective
functions, and even executable code to monitor a property. The output of VERIFAI
depends on the feature being invoked. For falsification, one or more counterexamples
(simulation traces) are produced showing how the property is violated [6]. For fuzz
testing, one or more traces are produced from the distribution of behaviors expressed
by the environment model described by the SCENIC language [10]. Error table analysis
involves collecting counterexamples generated by the falsifier into a table, on which
we perform analysis to identify features that are correlated with property failures. Data
augmentation uses falsification and error table analysis to generate additional data for
training and testing an ML component [7]. Finally, the property-driven synthesis of
model parameters or hyper-parameters generates as output a parameter evaluation that
satisfies the specified property.
Tool Structure: VERIFAI is composed of four main modules, as described below:
• Abstract Feature Space and SCENIC Modeling Language: The abstract feature space
is a compact representation of the possible configurations of the simulation. Ab-
stract features can represent parameters of the environment, controllers, or of ma-
chine learning components. For example, when analyzing a visual perception system
for an autonomous car, we might use an abstract feature space consisting of the initial
poses and types of all vehicles on the road. Note that this abstract feature space, as
compared to the concrete feature space of pixels used as input to the controller, is
better suited to the analysis of the overall closed-loop system (e.g. finding conditions
under which the car might crash).
VERIFAI provides two ways to construct abstract feature spaces. They can be con-
structed hierarchically, starting from basic domains such as hyperboxes and finite
sets and combining these into structures and arrays. For example, we could define
a space for a car as a structure combining a 2D box for position with a 1D box for
heading, and then create an array of these to get a space for several cars. Alterna-
tively, VERIFAI allows a feature space to be defined using a program in the SCENIC
language [10]. SCENIC provides convenient syntax for describing geometric config-
urations and initial conditions for agents, and, as a probabilistic programming lan-
guage, allows placing a distribution over the feature space which can be conditioned
by declarative constraints.
• Searching the Feature Space: Once the abstract feature space is defined, the next step
is to search that space to find simulations that violate the property or produce other
interesting behaviors. Currently, VERIFAI uses a suite of sampling methods (both
active and passive) for this purpose, but in the future we expect to also integrate di-
rected or exhaustive search methods including those from the adversarial machine
learning literature (e.g., see [8]). Passive samplers, which do not use any feedback
from the simulation, include uniform random sampling, simulated annealing, and
Halton sequence generation [14] (a quasi-random deterministic sequence with low-
discrepancy guarantees we found effective for falsification [6]). Distributions defined
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using SCENIC are also passive in this sense. Active samplers, whose selection of
samples is informed by feedback from previous simulations, include cross-entropy
and Bayesian optimization sampling. The former selects samples and updates the
prior distribution by minimizing cross-entropy; the latter updates the prior from the
posterior over a user-provided objective function, e.g. the satisfaction level of a spec-
ification or the loss of an analyzed model.
• Property Monitor: Trajectories generated by the simulator are evaluated by the moni-
tor that produces a score for a given property or objective function. By default, VER-
IFAI supports the Metric Temporal Logic [2] (MTL) via the
py-metric-temporal-logic [18] package. Both Boolean and quantitative se-
mantics of MTL are supported. The result of the monitor can be used to output fal-
sifying traces and also as feedback to the search procedure to direct the sampling
(search) towards falsifying scenarios.
• Error Table Analysis: Counterexamples are stored in a data structure called the error
table, whose rows are counterexamples and columns are abstract features. The error
table can be used offline to debug (explain) the generated counterexamples or online
to drive the sampler towards particular areas of the abstract feature space. VERIFAI
provides different techniques for error table analysis depending on the end use (e.g.,
counter-example analysis or data set augmentation), including principal component
analysis (PCA) for ordered feature domains and subsets of the most recurrent values
for unordered domains (further details are in [7]).
The communication between VERIFAI and the simulator is implemented in a client-
server fashion using IPv4 sockets, where VERIFAI sends configurations to the simulator
which then returns trajectories (traces). This implementation allows easy interfacing to
a simulator and even with multiple simulators at the same time.
3 Features and Case Studies
This section illustrates the main features of VERIFAI through case studies demonstrat-
ing its various use cases and simulator interfaces. Specifically, we demonstrate model
falsification and fuzz testing of an autonomous car controller, data augmentation and
error table analysis for a convolutional neural network, and model and hyperparameter
tuning for a reinforcement learning-based controller.
3.1 Falsification and Fuzz Testing
VERIFAI offers a convenient way to debug systems through systematic testing. Given
a model and a specification, the tool can use active sampling to automatically search
for inputs driving the model towards a violation of the specification. VERIFAI can also
perform model-based fuzz testing, exploring random variations of a scenario guided
by formal constraints. To demonstrate falsification and fuzz testing, we consider two
scenarios involving self-driving cars simulated with the robotics simulator Webots [19].
For the experiments reported here, we used Webots 2018 which is commercial software.
In the first example, we falsify the controller of an autonomous vehicle that must
navigate around a disabled car and traffic cones which are blocking the road. The con-
troller is responsible for safely maneuvering around the cones. To achieve this, we im-
plemented a hybrid controller. Initially, the car tries to remain in its lane using a line
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Fig. 2. A falsifying scene discovered by VERIFAI. The neural network misclassifies the traffic
cones because of the orange vehicle in the background, leading to a crash. Left: bird’s-eye view.
Right: dash-cam view, as processed by the neural network.
detector based on standard computer vision (non-ML) techniques1. At the same time, a
neural network (based on squeezeDet [21]) estimates the distance to the cones. When
the distance is less than 15 meters, the car begins a lane-changing maneuver, switching
back to lane-following once the cones are avoided.
The correctness of the autonomous vehicle is characterized by an MTL formula re-
quiring the vehicle to maintain a minimum distance from the traffic cones and avoid
overshoot while changing lanes. The task of the falsifier is to find small perturbations
of the initial scene (generated by SCENIC) which cause the vehicle to violate this speci-
fication. We allowed perturbations of the initial positions and orientations of all objects,
the color of the disabled car, and the cruising speed and reaction time of the ego car.
Our experiments showed that active samplers driven by the robustness of the mon-
itored MTL specification can efficiently discover scene perturbations that confuse the
controller and lead the autonomous vehicle into faulty behavior. One such counterex-
ample is shown in Fig. 2. The falsifier automatically discovered that the neural network
is not able to detect traffic cones when the car behind them is orange. In this particular
case, the lane change is begun too late and a crash with the disabled vehicle occurs.
In our second experiment, we used VERIFAI to simulate variations on an actual
accident involving an autonomous vehicle.2 In this accident, an autonomous car is
proceeding straight through an intersection when hit by a human turning left. Neither
car was able to see the other until immediately before impact because of two lanes of
stopped traffic. Fig. 3 shows a (simplified) SCENIC program we wrote to reproduce the
accident, allowing variation in the initial positions of the cars. We then ran simulations
from random initial conditions sampled from the program, with the turning car using a
controller trying to follow the ideal left-turn trajectory computed from OpenStreetMap
data using the Intelligent Intersections Toolbox [13]. The car going straight used a con-
troller which either maintained a constant velocity or began emergency breaking in
response to a message from a simulated “smart intersection” warning about the turning
car. By sampling variations on the initial conditions, we could determine how much
advance notice is necessary for such a system to robustly avoid an accident.
1 https://github.com/ndrplz/self-driving-car/blob/master/project 1 lane finding basic/
lane detection.py
2 March 2017 accident in Tempe, AZ. See https://www.12news.com/article/news/local/valley/
self-driving-uber-crashes-in-tempe/425480754.
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Fig. 3. Left: Partial SCENIC program for the crash scenario. Car is an object class defined in the
Webots world model (not shown), on is a SCENIC specifier positioning the object uniformly at
random in the given region (e.g. the median line of a lane), (-0.5, 0.5) indicates a uniform
distribution over that interval, and X @ Y creates a vector with the given coordinates (see [10]
for a complete description of SCENIC syntax). Right: 1) initial scene sampled from the program;
2) the red car begins its turn, unable to see the green car; 3) the resulting collision.
3.2 Data Augmentation and Error Table Analysis
Data augmentation is the process of supplementing training sets with the goal of im-
proving the performance of ML models. Typically, datasets are augmented with trans-
formed versions of preexisting training examples. In [7], we showed that augmentation
with counterexamples is also an effective method for model improvement.
Fig. 4. This image generated by our renderer was
misclassified by the NN. The network reported
detecting only one car when there were two.
VERIFAI implements a counterexample-
guided augmentation scheme, where a
falsifier (see Sec. 3.1) generates misclas-
sified data points that are then used to
augment the original training set. The
user can choose among different sam-
pling methods, with passive samplers
suited to generating diverse sets of data
points while active samplers can ef-
ficiently generate similar counterexam-
ples. In addition to the counterexamples
themselves, VERIFAI also returns an er-
ror table aggregating information on the
misclassifications that can be used to drive the retraining process. Fig. 4 shows the ren-
dering of a misclassified sample generated by our falsifier.
For our experiments, we implemented a renderer of road scenario images and tested
the quality of our augmentation scheme on the squeezeDet convolutional neural net-
work [21]. We adopted three techniques to select augmentation images: 1) randomly
sampling from the error table, 2) selecting the top k-closest (similar) samples from the
error table, and 3) using PCA analysis to generate new samples. For details on the image
renderer and the results of counterexample-driven augmentation, see [7].
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3.3 Model Robustness and Hyperparameter Tuning
In this final section, we demonstrate how VERIFAI can be used to tune test parameters
and hyperparameters of AI systems. For the following case studies, we use OpenAI
Gym [4], a framework for experimenting with reinforcement learning algorithms.3
First, we consider the problem of testing the robustness of a learned controller for a
cart-pole, i.e., a cart that balances an inverted pendulum. We trained a neural network
to control the cart-pole using Proximal Policy Optimization algorithms [15] with 100k
training episodes. We then used VERIFAI to test the robustness of the learned controller,
varying the initial lateral position and rotation of the cart as well as the mass and length
of the pole. Even for apparently robust controllers, VERIFAI was able to discover con-
figurations for which the cart-pole failed to self-balance. Fig. 5 shows 1000 iterations
of the falsifier, where sampling was guided by the reward function used by OpenAI to
train the controller. This function provides a negative reward if the cart moves more
than 2.4 m or if at any time the angle maintained by the pole is greater than 12 degrees.
For testing, we slightly modified these thresholds.
Fig. 5. The green dots represent model pa-
rameters for which the cart-pole controller
behaved correctly, while the red dots indi-
cate specification violations. Out of 1000
randomly-sampled model parameters, the
controller failed to satisfy the specification
38 times.
Finally, we used VERIFAI to study the effects of hyperparameters when training a
neural network controller for a mountain car. In this case, the controller must learn to
exploit momentum in order to climb a steep hill. Here, rather than searching for coun-
terexamples, we look for a set of hyperparameters under which the network correctly
learns to control the car. Specifically, we explored the effects of using different training
algorithms (from a discrete set of choices) and the size of the training set. We used the
VERIFAI falsifier to search the hyperparameter space, guided again by the reward func-
tion provided by OpenAI Gym (here the distance from the goal position), but negated
so that falsification implied finding a controller which successfully climbs the hill. In
this way VERIFAI built a table of safe hyperparameters. This table can be further an-
alyzed to find the hyperparameters which most affect the training process and which
hyperparameters the training is most robust to. This can be done studying the variation
across the parameters using PCA analysis.
3 https://github.com/openai/gym
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4 Conclusion
We presented VERIFAI, a toolkit for the formal design and analysis of AI/ML-based
systems. Although our focus has been on CPS, we note that VERIFAI’s architecture
should be applicable to simulation-based analysis of other systems. We also plan to
extend the toolkit beyond directed simulation to include symbolic techniques and in-
corporate synthesis methods (e.g. [1]). The artifact accompanying this paper includes
all the examples illustrating the various features of VERIFAI described in Sec. 3, with
detailed instructions and expected output.
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